We report the results of a randomized experiment testing impacts of subsidies for modern agricultural inputs in rural Mozambique. One-time provision of a voucher for fertilizer and improved seeds leads to substantial increases in fertilizer use, which persist through two subsequent agricultural seasons. Voucher receipt also leads to large, persistent increases in household agricultural production and market sales, per capita consumption, assets, durable good ownership, and housing improvements.
Introduction
Dierences in technology are widely believed to explain cross-country dierences in per capita GDP (Caselli and Coleman (2001) , Comin and Hobijn (2004) ).
Given that the majority of the world's poor work in agriculture (IFAD (2011)), much attention has been focused on adoption of modern agricultural inputs.
The substantial gains in agricultural productivity due to the Green Revolution involved introduction of improved seeds and modern fertilizers.
1 In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa has proved to be an outlier: from 1960 to 2000, it experienced the smallest increase in agricultural yields across regions of the world (Evenson and Gollin (2003) ). In 2009, fertilizer utilization in sub-Saharan Africa averaged only 13 kilograms per hectare; by contrast, in other developing countries the average was 94 kilograms per hectare.
2
Motivated by this disparity, many sub-Saharan African countries have embarked on perhaps the most signicant new development in agricultural policy over the past decade: large scale input subsidy programs aimed at raising the use of fertilizer and other modern inputs in agriculture. In ten African countries implementing input subsidy programs, program expenditures in 2011 amounted to $1.05 billion, or 28.6 percent of public expenditures on agriculture (Jayne and Rashid (2013) ).
3
The rapid spread of fertilizer subsidies has occurred alongside active debate as to their desirability. Schultz (1964) argued that farmers are rational prot maximizers who will choose optimal fertilizer use levels, so subsidies introduce distortions and reduce social welfare. Other arguments against subsidies include negative environmental externalities (WorldBank (2007) ) and regressive distribution schemes resulting from political inuence and elite capture (Chibwana et al. (2010) , Pan and Christiaensen (2011) , Lunduka et al. (2013) ). Advocates for subsidies point to market failures that would lead laissez-faire fertilizer use levels to be less than socially optimal. Motivated in part by concerns about such market failures, Sachs (2004) and Ellis (1992) have argued for fertilizer subsidies. In recent years, the World Bank has reversed previous decades' opposition to subsidies and now provides budget support for fertilizer subsidy programs 1 Norman Borlaug famously called high-yielding seed varieties the catalysts that ignited the Green Revolution, and chemical fertilizers the fuel that has powered its forward thrust (Borlaug 1972). 2 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) statistics, accessible at http://faostat.fao.org/site/422/default.aspx#ancor.
3 Fertilizer subsidies are not limited to Africa, of course. Indian fertilizer subsidies are also substantial, amounting to 1.52 percent of GDP in 2008-09 (Sharma and Thaker (2009) ). (Morris et al. (2007) ). 4 It is therefore important to shed light on the existence of any market failures in this context, so that rationales for input subsidies can be correctly evaluated.
We contribute to this debate on three fronts. First, we provide one of the rst randomized controlled trials of the impact of an input subsidy program, and the rst to measure impacts on a range of important household outcomes beyond fertilizer use itself. The only previous study using randomized methods is Duo et al. (2011) , who estimate impacts of fertilizer subsidies on fertilizer use alone (in rural Kenya). We show positive impacts of input subsidies (in Mozambique) on a range of outcomes beyond input use, including farm output, household consumption, assets, and housing quality.
Second, we nd positive eects of input subsidies that persist up to two annual agricultural seasons beyond the season in which the subsidies were oered.
This result contrasts with Duo et al. (2011) , who nd no persistent impact of either heavy (50%) subsidies for fertilizer or the well-timed nudge of oering free delivery at the time of the previous harvest. Both treatments raise fertilizer use in the season they are provided, but impacts are very close to zero and not statistically signicantly dierent from zero in the next season.
Third, we provide the rst eld experimental evidence of agricultural technology adoption spillovers within a social network.
5 Because the subsidy vouchers were randomly assigned, our study also generated random variation in the number of social network members (dened as those whom the respondent talked with at least moderately about agriculture in the previous season) who also received the input subsidy voucher. We nd that one's own fertilizer use rises in the number of social network members receiving the voucher.
Our results provide support for some classes of theoretical models of agricultural households, and evidence against others, thereby sharpening the types of arguments that can (and cannot) be made in support of input subsidies. Our ndings are consistent with models in which a one-time subsidy leads to persistent changes in technology adoption, such as models where subsidies create wealth eects that promote adoption, or that involve learning about the returns 4 Duo et al. (2011) provide experimental evidence from Kenya that farmers' behavioral biases leading to under-investment in fertilizer can be overcome more cost-eectively with well-timed small subsidies than large subsidies akin to those currently being implemented in sub-Saharan Africa.
5 Previous randomized studies of social network spillovers have focused on adoption of health goods, and include Kremer and Miguel (2007) , Dupas (2014) , and Oster and Thornton (2012) . Observational studies of agricultural technology adoption include Bandiera and Rasul (2006) , Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) , Conley and Udry (2010) , and Munshi (2006) . 2 to fertilizer. We provide such a model in Section 2 of the paper.
A number of patterns in our results are consistent with the subsidies operating via the learning channel. First, voucher winning leads study participants to report higher estimated returns from use of the input package. In addition, the eect of having voucher winners in one's social network is similar in magnitude to the impact of winning a voucher oneself, and occurs only in years subsequent to the voucher distribution season (after the results of fertilizer use by voucher winners can be observed).
Our results are inconsistent with models where a one-time subsidy does not lead to persistent technology adoption. For example, a simple Ramsey-style model without capital market imperfections and an optimal steady-state level of input utilization would predict that a one-time subsidy would have only a temporary eect, and that utilization would rapidly return to the steady state. Our results also are contrary to the prediction of a behavioral model a la Duo et al. (2011) , in which partially naïve farmers who face stochastic temptation shocks systematically delay fertilizer purchases, so that some farmers wait too long and run out of liquidity right before planting time and thus have lower utilization than optimal. In such a setting, a one-time nudge or subsidy raises adoption only in the current season, and is not persistent. Similarly, arguments that fertilizers are simply not protable at market prices because of soil characteristics (Marenya and Barrett (2009) ) imply that once-o subsidies may have temporary, but not long-lasting, impacts.
Our work is related to existing research on market failures in technology adoption. Past work has shown that technology adoption is inuenced by information imperfections, which lead to a need for learning about new technologies (Munshi (2006) , Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) , Bandiera and Rasul (2006) , Conley and Udry (2010) ); credit constraints (Miyata and Sawada (2007), Gine and Klonner (2005) ); and insurance market failures (Dercon and Christiaensen (2007) , Moser and Barrett (2006) , Foster and Rosenzweig (2009) 6 Experimental research on the persistence of technology adoption in response to short-term subsidies for health goods is also related Miguel (2007), Dupas (2014) , Tarozzi et al. (2014) ).
In the rest of this paper, we rst outline a simple theory that generates persistence of adoption in response to a one-time subsidy (Section 2). We then describe the study setting and experimental design in Section 3. Section 4 6 Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) 3. If the subsidy-induced adoption does not have any learning eects, then technology adoption may persist after expiration of the subsidy through a pure wealth eect. This wealth eect is stochastic (dependent on realized returns to fertilizer) and sustained adoption under it may be fragile in the sense that poor outcomes can lead to subsequent reversion to the no fertilizer equilibrium.
4. Sustained adoption becomes more likely (and stable) if the wealth eect is accompanied by positive learning eect of one-time subsidies. Positive learning can occur through a reduction in pessimism about expected returns to fertilizers as well as through a reduction in the diuseness or spread of beliefs about the distribution of fertilizer returns.
After laying out our core model assumptions, this section will rst consider the impact of fertilizers on the short-and long-run adoption of fertilizers in the absence of learning. We will then open the model to learning and consider 4 the additional insights and implications of temporary vouchers on sustained technology adoption. The Appendix explores learning about diuseness.
Technology and Subjective Beliefs
We model the behavior of agricultural households that are risk averse and lack access to contracts for both insurance and credit. We assume that traditional production technology does not require purchased inputs and provides a xed, non-stochastic output,x. Households can choose to augment the traditional technology with a divisible improved technology that utilizes a purchased input f (fertilizer) and produces output,x +yf , where y is the random return per unit fertilizer and we assume that it is distributed over the closed interval [y − , y + ], with probability distribution φ and with E φ [y] =ȳ. 7 Normalizing the price of the agricultural output to 1 and denoting the market price of fertilizer as p f , note that absent subsidy, the technology will be is protable in expectation if
We justify this constant marginal impact of fertilizer via an eciency wage theory of plant growth such that a given an amount of fertilizer is applied to an optimal area/number of plants, yielding a constant (expected) output increment per-unit fertilizer.
8 Spreading this amount of fertilizer across a larger area will decrease returns. Note that this perspective is consistent with standard fertilizer practice which is to concentrate a limited amount of fertilizer in a small area, rather than spreading it out so that each plant gets only some tiny amount. Importantly, this production specication means that marginal returns to fertilizer are always nite, even at low levels of use.
9
As we are interested in the behavior of farm households that largely lack prior experience using the improved technology, we assume that farmers lack full information on the true distribution of y. In the simplest case, we assume that farmers correctly understand the dispersion in returns to the improved technology, but are systematically biased in their beliefs about the level of those 7 Strictly speaking, this assumption applies only up to the point where the total amount of fertilizer exceeds the optimum amount for total farm size. We will ignore this eventual drop in returns to fertilizer as even the voucher program under study provides fertilizer well short of the optimum amount for the total cultivated area of households in our sample.
8 Specically we assume that plant yields are unresponsive at low levels of fertilizer or plant nutrition, and then have an increasing returns portion followed by a diminishing returns portion. As in the nutrition-based eciency wage theory, this relationship will pin down a unique level of fertilizer that maximizes returns.
9 Note that the same logic applies to improved seed as a small quantity of improved seeds will boost yields in the small area where they are planted, but cannot be ground up and spread out over the entire cultivated area for higher returns.
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returns. Specically, we assume that individuals believe that returns to fertilizer are driven by a random variableỹ = y − B, where B is the systematic bias in perceived returns. At time 0, we denote the bias as B 0 , and the subjective expected returns to fertilizer ofỹ given period 0 beliefs as E 0 (ỹ) =ȳ 0 . We dene beliefs as pessimistic if B 0 > 0 and optimistic if B 0 < 0.
For the case in which priors are not diuse, but are biased, we can write Consider a 3-period model of an agricultural household that produces and consumes the agricultural commodity.
10 We assume that the household is offered a once-o input subsidy in in period 1 that reduces the cost of fertilizer from p f to p f − v, where v is the voucher value. After period 1, the voucher expires and the price of fertilizer returns to its xed market price of p f . To explore the impact of this temporary fertilizer voucher subsidy, we consider the following model of an agricultural household that chooses how much to invest in rst and second period savings (s 1 , s 2 ) and fertilizer (f 1 , f 2 ) in order to maximize expected utility given its prior subjective beliefs about the returns to fertilizer:
10 The assumption of only 3 periods, with households consuming all cash on hand in period 3, is of course limiting, but it is sucient to allow us to garner key insights on short and medium term technology adoption.
6 where β = (1 + δ) −1 is the per-period discount factor, z 0 is initial cash on hand for the household, y 1 and y 2 represent the realized returns to fertilizer in production periods 1 and 2, respectively, and r is the xed interest rate factor for rst and second period savings. Given that returns to informal savings are low or even negative, we will assume that the households are impatient in the sense that βr < 1. Under this assumption, households will only use nancial savings to smooth consumption between periods, but not to build wealth.
Second Period Problem
We begin by examining second period choice conditional on realizations from the rst year crop yield. Dene second period cash-on-hand as z 2 =x + y 1 f 1 + rs 1 .
Note that second period cash on hand only depends on period 1 decisions and realizations. We can write the conditional second-period value function as:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are:
As can be seen from these conditions, the key comparison determining fertilizer use is the comparison of the expected benets (E 0 [y 2 u 3 ]) to the shadow price of liquidity (u 2 p f ) and returns to savings, r.
Analysis of this problem simplies when the rst order conditions are evaluated at the corner solution value of f 2 = 0. At this value, third period cash on hand is non-stochastic, making u 3 independent of the random variable y 2 . Evaluated at the corner solution (f 2 = 0), the household will only set f 2 > 0 if the following expression is true:
The rst term on the right hand side says that expected returns under fertilizer must exceed the shadow price or opportunity cost of liquidity, while the second says that discounted expected returns to fertilizer must exceed returns to savings if any funds are to be invested in fertilizer. If this condition does not hold, then fertilizer adoption will never be sustained in the second period. That is, consumption will be smoothed using the available savings technology.
Assuming that expected returns to fertilizer exceed the returns to savings,
> r, then we can dene a critical level of cash on hand,
such that the individual is just indierent between adopting and not adopting the improved technology in period 2. At the corner solution f 2 , s 2 = 0 increases in z 2 will only aect the shadow price of liquidity through u 2 and hence for values of values z 2 >z 2 , the individual will optimally adopt the new technology (i.e., set f 2 > 0), whereas no adoption will occur for lower values of z 2 . Usingz 2 , note that for any prior choices of f 1 and s 1 we can dene the minimum period 1 fertilizer returns necessary to give cash on hand ofz and to sustain fertilizer adoption s:
Absent learning, y(f 1 , s 1 ) is the minimum rst period returns to fertilizer that must be realized in order or the household to sustain the adoption of the new technology in period 2. Note that y is decreasing in both of its arguments. A fertilizer subsidy that induces rst period adoption of fertilizer thus creates a potential wealth eect that sustains fertilizer adoption in the second period by simply pushing net wealth or cash on hand above the minimum levelz 2 . In what follows, we will assume thatz >x. 
First Period Problem
Using the value function dened by 2, we can now examine the rst period problem as:
In general form, we can write the rst order conditions with respect to f 1 and s 1 as:
These conditions broadly mimic the conditions for the second period problem (3) except for two important dierences. First the subsidy v lowers the shadow price of a unit of fertilizer, making adoption of an interior solution with f 1 more likely. Second, the expected gains from fertilizer or savings are more complex.
To explore these expected gains, it is useful to break apart the second component of the maximand in (4) above into two pieces. Recalling that Φ 0 is the cumulative distribution for prior subjective beliefs, we dene Φ y = Φ 0 [y(f 1 , s 1 )] = P rob(y 1 > y(f 1 , s 1 )) and rewrite the second component of the maximand (4) as:
Denote the rst term in curly brackets as A and the second term in curly brackets as B. Note that B ≥ A.
Using this expression, we can, for example, rewrite the rst order condition with respect to f 1 as:
with a similar expression for the the derivative of V 1 with respect to s 1 . Because it is the corner condition at no fertilizer use that will determine adoption of the new technology, we again evaluate the rst order conditions at f 1 = 0. At this corner solution, note that u 2 is non-stochastic and that Φ y = 0, allowing us to rewrite conditions (5) as:
Note that with B > A, application of fertilizer not only has direct, short-term eect on second period well-being, but also an option value eect as it probabilistically opens the door to period 2 fertilizer investment and improved third period well-being.
As with the second period problem, there will be a critical minimum amount of cash-on-hand above which adoption occurs (if augmented expected returns exceed r). Note that this minimum level decreases with the magnitude of the subsidy and denote it asz 0 (v). Note also that pessimism about the returns to fertilizer (a larger value of B 0 which decreases E 0 [y 1 ]) will make it less likely fertilizer will increasez 0 (v) and make it less likely that fertilizer will be adopted even with subsidy.
Sustained Adoption and Disadoption
We are now in a position to examine the economics of fertilizer adoption. Drawn for a given set of initial beliefs, Figure 1 partitions the space dened by initial cash on hand (z 0 ) and stochastic rst period fertilizer returns (y 1 ) into three areas. The rst area is for all households with initial cash on hand less than the minimum necessary to invest in fertilizer (z 0 <z 0 (v)). If we assume thatx < z 0 (v = 0), then it is reasonable to assume that most households will not adopt fertilizer absent a subsidy. As the subsidy increases, the dashed vertical line in Figure 1 will shift to the left, crowding in more rst period experimentation with fertilizer.
For those that adopt fertilizer in period 1, two outcomes are possible. If returns are high enough to push second period cash on hand above the critical level z, then adoption of the technology will be sustained. Given that returns to fertilizer are stochastic, note that those who sustain technology adoption will be only a subset of those who adopted it in period 1, with the second period adoption probability being an increasing function of rst period fertilizer returns. The solid downward sloping curve in Figure 1 displays the values of z 0 and y 1 such that the household is just indierent between disadoption and sustained second period adoption. Those above the curve will continue to use For those with less buoyant rst period returns (y 1 < y(z 0 )), disadoption will occur. Note that some of these households (with 0 < y 1 < y) may boost savings in order to smooth consumption between periods 2 and 3. However, without more optimistic expectations about the returns to fertilizer, these households will not continue to adopt fertilizer beyond the subsidy period.
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Learning
The analysis so far has assumed that expected returns to fertilizer are unchanged by experience with the voucher coupons. However, individuals can learn from their own experience using fertilizers in period 1, as well as from the experience of others in their social network. Letting y 1 denote the returns to fertilizer obtained by the household in period 1, we dene the information content of this information as y * 1 = y 1 − E 0 (ỹ). Similarly, let y 1n be the yields that member n of the farmer's social network obtained using fertilizer in period 1 and the information content as y * 1n = y 1n − E 0 (ỹ). Assuming that the farmer has N 1 network members using fertilizer in period 1, then we can dene the information 11 content of the signal that the farmer receives from the network as:
From a Bayesian learning perspective, the farmer will update the bias in prior beliefs about returns to fertilizer (B 0 ) based on the strength of prior be- ). Assembling these pieces, we posit a learning model in which
). Foreshadowing the later empirical analysis in which we lack many of these specic measures, we note that the relative precision of the information received from the network depends on N , the number of network members experimenting with fertilizer.
In simplest terms, we can rewrite the update equation as
where d is a binary indicator of whether or not the farmer experimented with fertilizer in period 1.
How then does learning aect the use of fertilizer? To keep things (relatively)
simple, we assume that learning is unanticipated, meaning that rst period decisions are not aected by learning. However, realized fertilizer outcomes in excess of prior expectations will boost expected returns, loweringz 2 and y, as
shown by the dashed curve in Figure 1 . Conversely, negative information shocks (y * 1 , y n * 1 < 0) will shift the curve in the opposite direction, making sustained adoption less likely. Note that from a longer term perspective, positive learning about the returns to fertilizer would be expected to inoculate future behavior against disadoption following a single bad realization that reduces household liquidity, implying greater stability in adoption.
One thing to notice here is that realized returns (y 1 ) for the adopting household generates both a wealth eect and a learning eect. Without imposing further structure, an empirical nding that the farmer's own experimentation enhances future adoption would not cleanly identify whether such a persistent eect is the result of liquidity or learning eects, or some combination of the two. In contrast, experimentation by others in the farmer's social network would be expected to only inuence farmer learning and not his or her liquidity. 
Project Overview and Research Design
The study that is the subject of this paper is nested within a larger study of the impact of input subsidies, formal savings programs, and the interaction of subsidy and savings programs. Localities in Manica province were selected to be part of the larger study on the basis of inclusion in the provincial input voucher program as well as access to a mobile banking program run by Banco
Oportunidade de Mocambique (BOM, our implementation partner for the savings component of the project). To be accessible to the BOM savings program, which involved scheduled weekly visits of a truck-mounted bank branch, a village had to be within a certain distance of a paved road and within reasonable driving distance of BOM's regional branch in the city of Chimoio. These restrictions led to inclusion of 94 localities 12 in the larger study, across the districts of Barue, Manica, and Sussundenga.
Each of the selected 94 localities was then randomly assigned to either a no savings condition or to one of two savings treatment conditions (basic savings and matched savings), each with 1/3 probability. The 32 localities (with 41 component villages) randomly selected to be in the no savings condition did not experience any savings treatment, and are the subject of this paper. 12 The localities we use were dened by us for the purpose of this project, and do not completely coincide with ocial administrative areas. We sought to create natural groupings of households that had some connection to one another. In most cases our localities are equivalent to villages, but in some cases we grouped adjacent villages together into one locality, or divided large villages into multiple localities.
13 In a separate companion paper, the remaining 62 localities randomly assigned to one of the savings treatments will be combined with the 32 no savings localities in analysis of the interaction between savings and input subsidy programs. Farmers in the 62 savings program localities were also included in lotteries for input vouchers.
14 Such as, most notably, neighboring Malawi's national fertilizer subsidy scheme (Dorward and Chirwa (2011) 
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Lists of eligible farmers were created jointly by government agricultural extension ocers, local leaders, and agro-input retailers. Individuals were deemed eligible for a voucher coupon if they met the following program criteria: 1) farming between 0.5 hectare and 5 hectares of maize; 2) being a progressive farmer, dened as a producer interested in modernization of their production methods and commercial farming; 3) having access to agricultural extension and to input and output markets; and 4) being able and willing to pay for the remaining 27% of the package cost. Only one person per household was allowed to register.
Participants were informed that a lottery would be held and only half of those on the list would win a voucher. Vouchers were then randomly assigned to 50% of the households on the list in each village. Sample, balance tests, and attrition
Our sample for analysis in this paper consists of 514 study participants and their households in 41 villages (in 32 localities or groupings of villages). In each one of these villages, 50% of study participants were randomly selected to receive an input voucher. It is important to consider attrition from the study, and consider whether such attrition could lead to biased treatment eect estimates. We attempted to survey everyone in the initial sample at each subsequent survey round (in other words, attrition was not cumulative), so all attrition rates reported are 
Because use of the voucher is potentially endogenous to farmer characteristics, we focus on the impact of exogenously-determined treatment status. Our θ v are stratication cell xed eects representing the village of the study participant (recall that treatment was randomly assigned within village, so each village contains both treated and control study participants.) We report Huber/White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Outliers may have undue inuence on the treatment eect estimates for certain variables (such as fertilizer utilization in kilograms, or production in kilograms or money units). We take two approaches to reduce the inuence of outliers. First, we take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHST) of dependent variables.
18 Second, when expressing certain variables in levels, we truncate the variable at the 99th percentile (we replace values above the 99th percentile with the 99th percentile). The results tables will always show both IHST and levels (with 99th percentile truncation) specications.
Outcome variables of particular interest in this study include those that have substantial noise and relatively low autocorrelation, such as farm inputs and outputs. In this case, one can achieve increases in statistical power by taking multiple post-treatment outcome measures and estimating treatment eects on the average of post-treatment outcomes across multiple periods (McKenzie (2012)). We therefore also show impacts on average outcomes across the 2012 and 2013 seasons, which follow the treated 2011 season for which the input vouchers were distributed.
Voucher Take-up
We rst examine take-up of the subsidy voucher.
19 An important rst point to note is that there was non-compliance in both the treatment group and in the control group: in the treatment group, not all voucher winners used the voucher, and some farmers in the control group received the voucher.
Our study took place in the context of a government fertilizer voucher program, so distribution of vouchers to study participants was the responsibility of government agricultural extension agents (not our research sta ). Under the supervision of the research team, extension agents held a voucher distribution meeting in each village to which all voucher winners in that village were invited.
By itself, the requirement to co-nance the input package should be expected to lead nontrivial fractions of winners to choose not to take the voucher. In practice, 48.7% of voucher winners actually showed up and received their voucher.
20
Contrary to the study design that was agreed upon with the Manica provincial government, some control group respondents (voucher lottery losers) also ended up receiving vouchers. This resulted from a mismatch in objectives between provincial government leadership and extension agents on the ground who 18 The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHST) of x is log x + x 2 + 1 1 2 . When dependent variables are expressed in IHST, treatment eects can be interpreted as elasticities (as with the log transformation), but unlike the log transformation it is dened at zero. Burbidge et al. (1988) recommend the use of the IHST rather than the log transformation.
19 Voucher take-up and voucher use variables are reported by study participants in the rst survey (April 2011).
20 No voucher winners were denied vouchers if they wanted them, so all voucher non-receipt resulted from farmers choosing not to take the vouchers.
were actually distributing vouchers. Extension agents were each given a certain number of vouchers to distribute in the months leading up to the December 2010 planting period (including areas separate from the study villages.) The fact that take-up of the vouchers was less than 100% in the study villages meant that the unused vouchers were expected (by the national government and donor agencies funding the program) to be distributed to other farmers. Our research team emphasized that these unused vouchers should only be distributed outside the study villages. We were not entirely successful in ensuring this, however, since it was much less eort for extension agents to simply redistribute unused vouchers in the study villages (extension agents did not need to incur time and other costs of travel to other villages.) In the end, 12.9% of study participants in the control group received vouchers.
It is clear, therefore, that our intervention should be considered an encouragement design. Random assignment led to higher voucher receipt in the treatment group than in the control group. 21 The coecient on treatment is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level, indicating that the treatment led to an increase of the rate of voucher receipt from 14% to 51%.
Voucher receipt did not guarantee actual use of the voucher. Some voucher recipients chose not to bear the nancial cost of the input package co-payment, and the transport cost to and from the input supplier. The impact of assignment to the treatment group on actual use of the voucher is therefore lower, in percentage points, than the impact on voucher receipt. 19 when programs are implemented in collaboration with governments.
Treatment eect estimates
In this section, we trace the causal chain of voucher impacts, beginning with impacts on input use, followed by agricultural production and sales, and indicators of household well-being. We then assess the change in learning about expected returns to better understand underlying mechanisms.
Input utilization
The vouchers provided a subsidy for use of fertilizer and improved seeds, so we rst examine treatment eects on these outcomes. Table 3 (Table 2, col. 2), and the input package included 100 kg of fertilizer. If farmers taking up the package used the entire package and did not substitute for fertilizer they would have used anyway, the treatment eect on take-up would imply a treatment eect on fertilizer use amounting to 29 kg. This is very similar to the estimated treatment eect in Table 3 , Panel B, column 4: 22.7 kg (signicant at the 5% level). This result raises no substantial concerns that the subsidy voucher crowded out private demand for fertilizer on the part of study participants, which has been found in other contexts 
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By contrast, impacts on improved seed use do not persist into 2012-13: treatment eects in those periods are small and are not statistically signicantly different from zero. One point of note is that in the season prior to the intervention, 22% of the households were using fertilizer for maize cultivation compared to 53% for improved seeds. Given relatively high usage of improved seeds prior to the intervention, it may be that improved seed utilization was already near optimal levels, while fertilizer use was not.
Farm production and market sales
Given the treatment eects on fertilizer use, it is natural to next examine impacts on crop production and market sales. We do so in Table 4 .
The treatment has positive impacts on maize production and yield (columns 1 and 2) in the subsidy year, 2011. Impacts on yield are statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the 5% level in the IHST and levels specications. There is no evidence of impacts in that year on production of other crops (column 3),
22 Treatment eects on fertilizer use in the 2012 and 2013 seasons do not appear to be simply due to respondents saving some fertilizer from their subsidized input packages (that were intended to be used in 2011) for use in 2012 or 2013. Respondents were surveyed in 2011 and, if they had redeemed the subsidy voucher for inputs, were asked What did your household do with the fertilizer purchased with the voucher? Only 2.8% reported they had not used the voucher yet. 88.7% said they had already used it for agricultural production.
The remainder said they had sold the voucher (1.4%), gave some other response (1.4%), or did not respond to the question (5.6%).
the total value of crop production (column 4), or on sales of maize or all crops combined (columns 5 and 6).
Positive treatment eects on maize yield persist into the 2012-13 postsubsidy seasons, and are accompanied by positive impacts on production of other crops and on total production. Regressions for the average of 2012-13 outcomes reveal positive treatment eects on other crop production and total crop production that are signicant at conventional levels in both the IHST and levels specications. The positive eect on other crop production is likely related to the increase in fertilizer use on other crops that occurs post-subsidy.
The economic magnitude of the eect on total crop production is substantial. On average across 2012-13, the treatment leads to MZN 3,906 higher crop production (signicant at the 5% level), a 21.6% increase over the level in the control group. This is consistent with the 0.16 eect in the IHST specication and exceeds the market value of the package.
One of the objectives of the Mozambican subsidy program was the transformation of subsistence farmers into commercial farmers who sell their output in markets. The last two columns of Table 4 therefore examine treatment effects on market sales of maize and of all crops combined. There is no large or statistically signicant eect in the subsidy year, but positive eects emerge subsequently. On average across the 2012-13 seasons, the treatment leads to higher market sales of both maize and all crops. These eects are statistically signicant at the 5% level in the IHST specication for both outcomes.
Consumption, savings, assets, and housing quality
We now turn to treatment eects on consumption, savings, assets, and housing.
Regression results are in Table 5 .
There are no impacts on any of these outcomes in the subsidy year, 2011.
Point estimates are typically small in magnitude, and none are statistically signicantly dierent from zero at conventional levels.
Positive impacts emerge in the following two post-subsidy years. Again, we focus the discussion on impacts on the average of the 2012 and 2013 outcome variables. The treatment eect on per capita daily consumption in the household (column 1) is positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level in both the IHST and levels specications.
23 The impact amounts to MZN 10.59 per day,
23
In results not shown, we nd no large or statistically signicant impact of the treatments on the number of household members, in total as well as in various age subcategories.
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14.7% increase over the mean in the control group. One might take this as perhaps the best overall summary result indicating that the treatment led to an improvement in household well-being.
The remaining columns of the table examine impacts on various types of assets. There are positive eects on all types of assets in columns 2-5, which are substantial in magnitude and statistically signicantly dierent from zero in IHST specications in the case of total savings, livestock, food stocks, and total savings and assets (column 6). Results in levels specications are also positive and large in magnitude, but are less precise, so only the results for total savings and food stocks are statistically signicant (both of these at the 1% level). Table 6 presents impacts of the treatment on housing improvements (which were not included in total assets and savings in Table 5 ). The rst dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the respondent reported undertaking any housing improvement (across the specic types in the table). There is no impact in the rst year, but on average over the subsequent two years there is a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of making any housing improvement that is statistically signicant at the 5% level, providing additional evidence of long term improvement in the living conditions of the beneciaries.
The remaining columns of the table reveal that the specic areas of housing improvement are in walls and oors. The fact that most improvements occur in the year 2013 is consistent with the need for a period of savings before making this lump sum investment.
Learning eects
Our theoretical model makes clear that a temporary subsidy could have persistent eects on technology adoption either via a wealth channel, or via learning about the returns to the technology. To shed light on whether a learning channel is operative, we asked farmers in all three survey rounds the following questions about perceived returns to fertilizer: In the rst eld where your household planted maize this year, if you use improved seed and fertilizer, what is the total production that is expected in: a) an average year, b) a very good year, and c) a very bad year?. Respondents were told to assume the use of 100 kg of urea, 100 kg of NPK fertilizer, and 25 kg of improved seeds per hectare. Respondents also gave estimates assuming that no improved inputs had been used, and were asked to indicate how many years out of ten they expected to be average, very good and very bad years. These probability elicitations allow us to calculate 23 farmers' unconditional expected returns to improved seeds and fertilizers. These ndings that the treatment raised perceived returns to the input package are consistent with the existence of a learning channel, as outlined in the theoretical section.
Spillovers in the social network
Our theoretical model allows the subsidy to aect technology adoption via learning about the returns to the new technology, not only from one's own experience but also from the experience of others in one's social network. Examination of social network eects is also of interest because experimentation by others in one's social network would be expected to only inuence farmer learning and not his or her liquidity. Eects stemming from experimentation in the social network are therefore more likely to be due to learning than wealth eects.
Our study design involved randomizing treatment assignment within villages, so fertilizer adoption of study participants could be aected not only by their own treatment status, but also by the extent of treatment (voucher winning) in their social networks. To analyze eects of treatment within the social network, we estimate the causal eect of the number of social network members winning vouchers in the lottery. This analysis relies on two features of our study.
First, we have data on social network links prior to treatment, which we collected ourselves in a manner analogous to Conley and Udry's (2010) elicitation of information links. Study participants were presented with the full list of other study participants in the same village, and asked which of these they talked to about agriculture in the season prior to the study (2009) (2010) ,
and if so whether they did so a bit, moderately, or a lot. For each study participant, others whom they indicated as having talked to about agriculture moderately or a lot are considered part of the participant's social network.
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Note that, because we are interested in understanding spillovers of our randomized treatment within the social network, this elicitation only captures social network links among study participants in the village, not the full set of social network links (which would include study non-participants). Each respondent was asked about their links with 11.5 other study partipants on average. Crucially for this analysis, respondents report quite substantial variation in social network links with other study participants (in other words, study participants do not have identical social networks). The distribution of number of social network links is given in Table 8A . The median number of social network links is two. 30.0% of respondents said they had no social network links with other study participants. 16.1% said they had one link, 12.6% had two, 7.4% had three, 8.6% had four, and 25.3% had ve or more.
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Second, we take advantage of the fact that randomization of the input subsidy voucher also generates random variation in the number of voucher winners within a respondent's social network. individuals with at least one study participant in their social network, the ratio of number of voucher winners in the social network to number of study participants in one's social network has a mean of 0.485, very close to the 0.5 ratio that would be expected given the one-half probability of voucher winning.
We estimate impacts of voucher winning in the social network on fertilizer use (Y iv ) for study participant i in village v, via the following modied version of the ITT regression equation 6:
As in equation 6, Z iv is the individual treatment indicator, and the regres- Regression results are in Table 9 . The coecient estimates on having two or more voucher winners in one's social network are even larger, ranging in magnitude from 0.86 to 1.37. The fact that voucher winning in one's social network has eects equal to or larger than eects of winning oneself is also consistent with learning being the primary channel of the voucher impacts, as opposed to the wealth channel.
Another broad pattern of note is that the eects of voucher winning in the social network appear to be nonlinear. There is typically a positive eect of having one voucher winner in the social network, and a somewhat larger eect of having two, but the eect appears to atten thereafter, with not much additional impact of having three, four, or ve or more winners in the social network (relative to having two).
Conclusion
We report the results of a randomized experiment testing impacts of a subsidy for modern agricultural inputs (fertilizer and improved seeds) on input utilization, agricultural output, and other household outcomes. We nd substantial and persistent impacts (spanning three years following the one-time subsidy) on all these outcomes.
Our results are consistent with a set of theoretical models that predict persistence of one-time subsidies, and inconsistent with others that do not have Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. All dependent variables expressed in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHST). Regressions also include as controls indicator variables for having 1, 2, 3, 4, and "5 or more" study participants in one's social network (the category "0"is omitted). See Table 8 for social network definitions and statistics, and Table 3 for other notes on regression specification. For the special case in which priors are not diuse, but are potentially biased, we can write φỹ(ỹ) = φ y (y + B 0 ).
ONLINE APPENDIX FOR
• Distribution of Returns: Second, we assume that learning reduces the diuseness of prior beliefs. In particular, we assume that based on observation of own and neighbors' period 1 returns to fertilizers, updated period 1 beliefs are no more diuse than period 1 beliefs. Specically, holding the bias in expected returns constant, period 0 beliefs can always be expressed as a mean preserving spread of period 1 beliefs.
While there are various ways to model learning, we here assume that learning is naive or unanticipated. Under this assumption, rst period choice is exactly as modeled above. However, unanticipated learning will make second period or sustained adoption more likely under our assumption that experience operates as a mean preserving squeeze, making φ 1 (y) less diuse than the prior φ 0 (y).
As shown above, this shift in subjective beliefs will lowerz 2 , making expanding the set of individuals who will sustain adoption of the new technology.
